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THE SCOPE OF THE, SIXTH AMENDMENT':
WHO IS A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT?*
DAVID ROSSMAN* *

I.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL:

THE RESOURCE PROBLEM

When the Supreme Court, in Argersinger v. Hamlin,' extended the
right to counsel to misdemeanor defendants facing imprisonment, it
raised the prospect of an eventual expansion of this right to defendants
in all criminal prosecutions. This expansion appears to be the probable
culmination of the historical development of the right to counsel.' While
prediction from a trend is never fully satisfactory, a trend toward such
expansion exists nonetheless. 3 The interpretation of the scope of the
sixth amendment right to counsel as applied to the states has evolved
from application to defendants in capital cases, 4 to application to those
whose lack of ability represented special circumstances,' and then, to
*

This article was prepared in the course of a Boston University Center for Criminal

Justice project on the implications of the Supreme Court decision in Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). The project was sponsored by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The author acknowledges the assistance of the other members of
the Center for Criminal Justice in the preparation of this article and, in particular, the
research provided by Mr. Harry Wise.
** Staff Attorney, Center for Criminal Justice, Boston University School of Law.
1 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
2 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(sixth amendment right to counsel
incorporated in fourteenth amendment due process clause); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938) (extended right to all indigent defendants in federal cases tried in federal
courts); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to counsel exists for indigents
accused in federal courts of capital offenses). See generally, Comment, Right to Counsel:
A New Standard, 27 Sw. L.J. 406 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Right to Counsel].
3 Justices Powell and Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion, view Argersinger as "foreshadow[ing] a broad prophylactic rule" that would require the appointment of counsel
to indigents in all criminal cases. 407 U.S. at 51-52.
4 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
5 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Betts held that the failure to appoint counsel
in a non-capital state felony trial was not a denial of due process where ideas of
fundamental fairness are not offended:
[Tihe Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the common fundamental ideas of
fairness and right, and while want of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness, we cannot say
that the Amendment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for
[633 ]
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affording the right to all defendants in felony cases.6 Argersinger has
now extended the right to misdemeanor defendants who face imprisonment.7 The trend in interpretation of what the right to counsel encompasses is obvious. 8
The sixth amendment, applicable to both the federal government and
the states, 9 on its face calls for the provision of defense counsel in "all
criminal prosecutions."' 0 It makes no distinction between prosecutions
in which imprisonment is a possibility and those in which it is not. The
majority in Argersinger, in fact, based its decision on the unequivocal
language on the sixth amendment." None of the other rights guaranteed
therein are restricted to only serious crimes save right to jury. This distinction is justified by the unique historical background of the jury,
which is not found in the case of any other sixth amendment right.' In
his concurring opinion, Justice Powell noted that the reasoning relied
on by the majority left no conclusion other than that the right to counsel would be extended even further:
The logic [which the majority] advances for extending the
right to counsel to all cases in which the penalty of any imprisonment is imposed applies equally well to cases in which
other penalties may be imposed.'
The prospect that the right to appointed counsel will be applied to all
criminal defendants is not, in the abstract, a frightening one. The pracany offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded
a defendant who is not represented by counsel.
316 U.S. at 473. Betts has generally been seen as an aberration in the evolution of the
right to court-appointed counsel. Right to Counsel, supra note 2, at 407 n.9. See Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
6
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
7 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
8 See Comment, Misdemeanant's Right to Counsel: A Retrospective View of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 9 GONZAGA L. REV. 169 (1973).
9 It is of course, more accurate to state that the specific requirements of the sixth

amendment are applicable to the states only by virtue of the fourteenth. Even a cursory
examination of the sixth amendment cases will reveal that the current Court regards
its constitutional decisions concerning specific sixth amendment rights equally applicable
to the states as to the federal government. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356,
395-96 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11

The Sixth Amendment thus extended the right to counsel beyond its
common-law dimensions. But there is nothing in the language of the
Amendment, its history, or in the decisions of this Court, to indicate that
it was intended to embody a retraction of the right in petty offenses
wherein the common law previously did require that counsel be provided.
407 U.S. at 30.
12407 U.S. at 29-30, 48.

131d. at 52.
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tical problems of implementing this right on such a large scale, however, do raise doubts in the minds of many observers of the criminal
justice system. 4 The difficulties involved in providing enough attorneys
to satisfy the demands of the Argersinger decision alone were enough
to cause Justice Powell to warn that the decision might seriously over,tax the capabilities of many judicial systems, leading to a situation
where "[t]he community could simply not enforce its own laws."' 5
The practical problems engendered by the extension of the right to
counsel played a major role in limiting the right to those who face
imprisonment and thus denying it to hundreds of thousands of other
misdemeanor defendants. Many courts which faced the problem of
rationalizing a limit on the right to counsel have acknowledged that
such line-drawing was made necessary by the sheer impracticability of
a more complete extension of the right.' 6 If the extension of the right
to counsel to just misdemeanor defendants who face imprisonment
caused such trepidation, even greater dismay would be evoked by the
prospect of extension of the right to all criminal defendants.'
It would be unrealistic to suppose that the immense practical problems involved in providing enough attorneys will not play a part in the
decision regarding how far the right to counsel will be extended beyond
Argersinger. However, if the magnitude of the problem involved in
applying the right to counsel to all sixth amendment defendants is the
stumbling block, there are some principled distinctions that may alleviate the burden on the lower courts. Specifically, if there may not be
enough attorneys available for all sixth amendment defendants who
cannot retain private counsel, perhaps the consequence should not be
14 Id. at 55-62. See also Right to Counsel, supra note 2, at 410-11.

15 407 U.S. at 61.
16E.g., Brinson v. State, 269 F. Supp. 747, 749 (S.D. Fla. 1967); Creighton v. State,
257 F. Supp. 806, 808-09 (E.D.N.C. 1966); Application of Wright, 189 N.W.2d 447,
451 (S.D. 1971). In an article which proposed an imprisonment in fact distinction for
right to counsel, the possibility was noted of the obvious justification that such a line
"does not purport to be a principled one . . . it is nothing more or less than the best
compromise between the demands of constitutional policy and the limitations of purse
and personnel." Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV.
685, 712 (1968).
17 In terms of sheer volume, this prospect is awesome. During 1966, it was estimated
that all state and federal courts handled 350,000 felonies each year, as compared with
5,000,000 lesser offenses, excluding traffic offences. Report of the Conference on Legal
Manpower Needs of Criminal Law, 41 F.R.D. 389, 392 (1966). It has been estimated
that about 50,000,000 traffic offenses are tried each year. Note, Dollars and Sense of an
Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1261-62 (1970). As a point of
reference illustrating the magnitude of the potential problem, during the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1972, criminal parking violations in the State of Massachusetts totalled
368,146. THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (1972).
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renewed efforts to justify affording the right to a court appointed attorney to some criminal defendants and not to others. Rather, what is
called for is a more rigorous analysis of exactly what the term "criminal
prosecutions" encompasses-for it is only with criminal prosecutions
that the sixth amendment is concerned. The area to reevaluate, in other
words, is not the scope of the right, but the scope of the amendment.
A decision by the Fifth Circuit three years prior to Argersinger suggests this solution. In James v. Headley,' the court ruled that counsel
is required in cases which may result in imprisonment.19 Judge Wisdom
commented on the problem of limiting the scope of the right:
...

if accuseds should be provided counsel in all petty offense

cases, the great constitutional right to counsel could be carried
to absurdity; city and state systems of justice could be so overburdened as to break down .

. .

. The problem is how to give

judicial recognition to exceptions when the constitution does
not in terms allow exceptions.
The ancient principle, de minimus non curat lex, provides
a lawful, logical and practical basis for trifling criminal prosecutions. .

.

. [Iun the thinking of the average citizen, non-

serious cases, such as most traffic cases, are not criminal
prosecutions. Moreover, there is something to be said for
flexibility, when a rigid standard jeopardizes either fair trial
procedures or effective administration of courts. [emphasis
20
added]
Understanding the reach of the sixth amendment bears in two ways
on the resource question alluded to by Judge Wisdom. First, a court
can identify those offenses, presently labeled criminal, that are not true
sixth amendment criminal prosecutions. To the extent that certain minor
offenses are now erroneously thought of as crimes, the resource allocation problem revolving around extension of the right to counsel is distorted. Second, and more important in terms of its potential effect, a
legislature aware of the proper scope of the amendment will be able to
remove the strict requirements of the sixth amendment from certain
offenses by setting up new procedures for dealing with them. The discussion that follows attempts first to delineate the bounds of the sixth
amendment, and then to apply this definition to existing classes of
offenses to illustrate how these two techniques for dealing with the
resource problem may be applicable.
18 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969).
19 "Regardless of labels, an offense is serious enough to require appointment of counsel
if it may result in the loss of liberty for any period of time." Id. at 334.
20

Id.
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MEANING OF SIXTH AMENDMENT CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

A. Civil or Criminal: Why a Diflerence
The fundamental question in this discussion is the meaning of the
sixth amendment term "criminal prosecutions" as it relates to the requirement of appointment of counsel. In effect, who is a criminal defendant?
There are two propositions essential to an analysis of this question:
(a) defendants in all criminal prosecutions require the assistance of
counsel because of the command of the sixth amendment; and (b) all
actions where the state is the complainant, not falling within the ambit
of the sixth amendment are civil actions, and the question of whether in
these cases counsel will be appointed depends on a due process analysis.
While the focus of this discussion is the question of the sixth amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel, this right is only one of a
number of procedural safeguards attendant upon a criminal prosecution
that are spelled out in the sixth amendment. In noncriminal proceedings-such as civil forfeiture-the procedures to be followed are defined only in the vague principles expressed by the term "due process. "21
Although individual sixth amendment safeguards may come to be required in a particular situation as part of due process, criminal defendants on the whole are clothed in stronger constitutional armor than
their civil counterparts.
The "terrible engine" of the criminal justice system derives its strength
from the power of the state-against which is arrayed the meager resources of an individual citizen. A system of government concerned
with the potential for abuse that is present whenever such an inherently
unequal situation exists should be more careful to spell out procedural
safeguards in such situations than in situations where one individual
citizen faces another. It is true, of course, that this generality in the
difference between civil and criminal cases does not hold up throughout
the system. The state often presents itself as the party seeking redress
in civil actions. However, with respect to these situations, a crucial
difference exists between civil sanctions and criminal. The effect on the
individual involved is vastly different. Criminal sanctions often include
the possibility of imprisonment. Even when they do not, a wide array
of collateral consequences-ranging from those having immediate detrimental effect to the ephemeral stigma that may attach-follow from a
criminal conviction; consequences that are not commonly associated
with a civil judgment.
21 U.S. CONST.

22

amends. V & XIV.

22 There are, of course, "civil cases which result in loss of liberty-commitment, for
example. The trend in such cases, though, is to treat them for the purposes of pro-
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The range of criminal sanctions is, of course, a continuum. At one
end, the consequences of a conviction to the individual are harsh; at
the other end, they seem rather like those that may befall the unfortunate civil defendant. If courts are to make the judgment on where the
"criminal" continuum ends and the "civil" one begins, some firm guidelines must be made explicit.
B. Labels
How simple would be the tasks of constitutional adjudication
and of law generally if specific problems could be solved by
inspection of the labels pasted on them!"3
To the two propositions mentioned earlier concerning sixth amendment appointment of counsel, can be added a third: (c) the formal
label of a proceeding does not necessarily determine the question of
whether the proceeding falls within the category of criminal prosecutions or civil actions.
It seems clear that in determining whether an action falls within that
class to which the rights enumerated in the sixth amendment apply, the
label supplied by the state is not the determinative factor.2 4 Unfortunately, the expectation that a change in label will in fact result in a
change in substance is not an altogether rare phenomenon.2 5 However,
26
the sixth amendment is not bound by labels.
cedural safeguards, as if they were criminal. See text accompanying notes 61-86 infra.
Cf. Fins, Can Form Ignore Substance, 2 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PRO. 205 (1969).
23
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94 (1958).
24 The United States Supreme Court has indicated its adherence to this view in Paterson v. Warden, 372 U.S. 776 (1963) (per curiam). Paterson involved a defendant
convicted without aid of counsel, because the crime was labelled a misdemeanor, although carrying a maximum term of two years imprisonment. The Court remanded the
case for further consideration in light of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
On remand, the Maryland Court of Appeals found Gideon to be controlling. Paterson v. State, 231 Md. 509, 191 A.2d 237 (1963).
The implication derived by the Maryland court from the Supreme Court's remand was
an obvious proposition: once Gideon had established that, insofar as felony defendants
were concerned, counsel had to be provided, then the state could not avoid the impact
of this rule by labelling as a "misdemeanor" a crime which in all of its material consequences to the defendant resembled a felony. As stated succinctly by Mr. Justice
Stewart: "No state should be permitted to repudiate [right to counsel] by arbitrarily
attaching the label 'misdemeanor' to a criminal offense." Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S.
907, 908 (1966) (dissenting from denial of certiorari). See also Taylor, The Supreme
Court, the Individual and the Criminal Process, I GA. L. REV. 386, 434 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Taylor].
25

A draft code recently prepared for one of the new nations undertook a
complete revision of the terminology of crime. The code itself was designated not as a Penal or Criminal Code, but as a "Code of Correction."
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Just as a state could not provide a maximum two-year penalty for
assault and battery and yet call it a misdemeanor in hopes of evading
Gideon's rule requiring counsel for felony defendants, it may not take
the more drastic step of changing the official title of an offense such as
assault and battery from criminal to civil for the purposes of avoiding
the sixth amendment altogether.27 The sixth amendment was intended
to act as a limit on the power of the government, and to permit it to be
circumvented in such a manner would reduce its protection to a nullity.
An overnight switch in label, with no underlying substantive change in
any other respect, would not remove an offense from the umbrella of
the sixth amendment:
A statute providing that a "person shall lose his liberty by
committing bank robbery" though in form a regulation of
liberty, would nonetheless be penal. Nor would its penal effect'
be altered by labeling it regulation of banks or by arguing
that there is a rational relationship between safeguarding
banks and imprisoning bank robbers. The inquiry must be
directed to substance.28
If it is intuitively obvious that something which was a crime yesterday may not merely be relabeled today with the hope of evading the
sixth amendment, it is somewhat harder to define what factors one
should look to in classifying an offense as a sixth amendment criminal
prosecution.
C. Criminal Contempt and Municipal Ordinance Violations:
The Eflect on the Individual
In two types of cases-criminal contempt and municipal ordinance
violations--courts have grappled with the question of the proper characterization of the proceedings for the purpose of the application of
criminal procedural safeguards. In both situations the results have
hinged on the effect of an adverse determination on the defendant.
In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court, relying primarily on an
historical analysis, held that criminal contempt was not a sixth amend-

How little is likely to be accomplished by such changes in nomenclature
can be seen if we weigh the present connotations of expressions like
"reformatory" and "house of correction" against the hopes that must have
accompanied the original coinage of those terms.
L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 33 (1968).
26 Paterson v. State, 231 Md. 509, 191 A.2d 237 (1963).
27 Cf. Taylor, supra note 24 at 436-37.
28 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95 (1958).
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ment crime.2" The later rulings came over a strong dissent by Justice
Black:
As it may now be punished criminal contempt is manifestly
a crime by every relevant test of reason or history. ...
It
possesses all of the earmarks commonly attributed to a crime.
A mandate of the Government has allegedly been violated for
which severe punishment may be exacted-punishment aimed
at chastising the violator for his disobedience."0
Ten years later, however, a majority of the Court in Bloom v. Illinois
was won over to this more functional view:
Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense; it is a
violation of the law, a public wrong which is punishable by
fine or imprisonment or both."1
Another area in which courts have had trouble classifying an offense
as civil or criminal is the enforcement of municipal ordinances. In this
country, violations of municipal ordinances are ordinarily enforced
through actions considered to be civil proceedings.3 2 One justification
for this view was the theory that only the collective voice of the entire
sovereign people could create a crime, and that an offense against a
municipality did not constitute an offense against the state. 33 Historically, at common law, the action for such a violation against the munic29
See, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183 & n.14 (1958) (criminal
contempt convictions for failure to surrender and being fugitives for four and one-half
years); United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 298 (1947)
(union and its president guilty of criminal and civil contempt); Gompers v. United
States, 233 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1914) (trial by jury not extended as a matter of constitutional right to criminal contempts).
30 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 201 (1958).
31 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968) (constitutional guarantee of jury trial extended to serious
criminal contempt).
32 9 E. MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 27.05 (3d ed. 1964)
[hereinafter cited as MCQUILLAN].
33 W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIME § 2.01 (6th ed.
1958). See, e.g., McClain v. United States, 224 F.2d 522, 525 (5th Cir. 1955) ("Police
court convictions for violation of city ordinances are not convictions of crime. Crime
is an act committed in violation of public law, a law coextensive in application with
the boundaries of the state which enacts it."); Portland v. Goodwin, 187 Ore. 409, 210
P.2d 577 (1949) (violation of municipal ordinance not a crime, but at most a public
tort, quasi-criminal in character). But ci, State v. Mayes, 245 Ore. 179, 421 P.2d 385
(1966) (prosecution for violation of ordinance forbidding driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is a criminal proceeding which requires procedural due
process and which acts as a bar to another prosecution for the some act). See also
Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Ore. 94, 458 P.2d 414 (1969) (extends right to counsel to
prosecutions for misdemeanors, a term that included violations of municipal ordinances
and all criminal prosecutions not amounting to felonies, where the conviction may result in a loss of liberty by imprisonment for six months).
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ipality was in the form of either debt or assumpsit.3 4 When a defendant
is incarcerated as a result of his violation of a municipal ordinance, it
is harder to maintain the fiction of collecting a debt. However, the
majority of jurisdictions express the view that the fact that the defendant may be arrested and retained in custody, or placed under reasonable recognizance, or jailed for failure to pay a fine, does not render
the case criminal. 5
Not all courts, however, take such a formalistic view of the matter.
A pioneer decision by the Colorado Supreme Court, thirteen years
prior to Argersinger, recognized the serious nature of a sanction involving imprisonment. 36 With respect to the application of sixth amendment
safeguards to a prosecution for violation of a municipal ordinance that
resulted in a ten-day jail sentence, the court in Canon City v. Merris
stated that the:
trial is civil in nature but the effects and consequences are
criminal in fact. Label the judicial process as one will, no resort to subtlety can refute the fact that the power to imprison
is a criminal sanction. To view otherwise is self-delusion.
37
Courts should not, ostrich-like, bury their heads in the sand.
Other courts have recognized that the type of sanction actually imposed for the violation of a municipal ordinance may remove the proceeding from the civil realm. 38 Although examining the consequence to
34 The action of assumpsit was based on the fiction that the defendant had breached a
duty which he had promised the municipal corporation to perform. In the action of
debt, the statutory amount of the fine was the equivalent of liquidated damages. See

MCQUILLAN, supra note 32 at § 27.05.
35See MCQUILLAN, supra note 32 at § 27.06 & n.8 (citing cases from Alabama,

Georgia, Illinois, Missouri, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming). See also Biedinger v. East Chicago, 129 Ind. App. 42, 44-45, 154 N.E.2d
58 (1958); Quigley v. Aurora, 50 Ind. 28 (1875); White v. Neptune City, 56 N.J.L.
222, 28 A. 378 (1893).
36
Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 1".2d 614 (1958) (defendant convicted
of operating an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation
of city ordinance).
37 137 Colo. at 174, 323 P.2d at 617.
38 In New Jersey certain petty offenses were traditionally dealt with, both legislatively
and judicially, "not as crimes but as lesser offenses which do not carry the stigmata or
disabilities incident to convictions of crime. . . . [but] whenever the particular nature
of the charge is such that imprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude is
actually threatened or is a likelihood on conviction, the indigent defendant should have
counsel assigned to him." Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 293, 295, 277 A.2d
216, 222-23 (1971) (conviction of defendant of disorderly person offense-use of
narcotic drugs and possession of paraphenalia-set aside as a fundamental deprivation
of procedural due process since a prison sentence was imposed and no counsel provided).
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the individual is certainly one means of discarding labels in favor of
substance in the process of defining sixth amendment criminal prosecutions, it is not the only factor.
D. Factorsthat Identify "CriminalProsecutions"
Courts have been called upon to define criminal prosecutions in contexts other than questions of the sixth amendment right to appointment
of counsel. Adjudication concerning jury right,3 9 ex post facto legislation,4" and double jeopardy problems,41 all call for a determination of
the meaning of criminal prosecutions. Over time, a list of relevant factors has evolved. These factors, however, may not point in the same
direction in any given case. Some are more significant than others, and
a court faced with the problem of determining whether or not an action
is a criminal prosecution must weigh the several factors in order to
arrive at a conclusion.
The Supreme Court has had occasion to list the factors by which an
offense is categorized as a sixth amendment crime. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the court reviewed a statute that provided for automatic
forfeiture of citizenship, without any hearing, for a United States citizen
who in time of war was absent from the country with the purpose of
evading service in the armed forces.42 Although the Court stated that
Congressional intent made clear the penal nature of the statute,43 and
39 See, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970)
(right to trial by jury for
all serious crimes-where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized);
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (jury trial extended to serious criminal contempt); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (accused has right to jury trial for
offense of simple battery notwithstanding that only sentenced to sixty days and given
nominal fine).
40 See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866) (state constitutional
provisions depriving certain priests and clergymen of the right to preach could only be
interpreted as punitive and the deprivation of rights previously enjoyed). Accord, Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937) (revision of a statute that made 15-year
sentence mandatory applied retrospectively); United States v. Henson, 486 F.2d 1292,
(retrospective application of a statute mandating the admission into
1305 (1973)
evidence of certain prior convictions of an accused if the accused testifies in his own
behalf).
41 See, e.g., One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235-36
(1972) (civil forfeiture proceeding not barred by prior acquittal on criminal charge);
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943) (second punishment was a
civil one to permit restitution to the government of money taken from it by fraud and
no double jeopardy with previous conviction, concerning the same transaction, for defrauding the government); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (Congress may
impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission).
See generally Portland v. Goodwin, 187 Ore. 409, 210 P.2d 577 (1949).
42372 U.S. 144 (1963).
43 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, tit. III, ch. 3, § 349(a), 66 Stat.
163, 267-68, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(10) (1970).
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thus the sixth amendment was violated by the summary nature of the
proceeding, it did spell out the factors that, even without such clear
legislative intent, would indicate whether a sanction was penal (criminal) 4 4 or regulatory (civil) in nature:
(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint;
(2) whether it historically has been regarded as a punishment;
(3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter;
(4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence;
(5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime;
(6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may be connected
rationally is assignable for it;
(7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative pur45
pose assigned.
The relationship between these factors is not made clear in the
opinion. Certainly the situation in Mendoza-Martinez was not one
where the legislative intent and the analysis of the enumerated factors
pointed in different directions, and so, no firm judgment was made on
which would control in the event that they did. 46 In any case, legislative
intent is decidedly relevant in determining which way several of the
factors point in deciding whether a sanction is punitive so that the
functional analysis is likely to coincide with the determination of legislative intent.47
In addition to the seven factors listed by Justice Goldberg in Mendoza-Martinez, there are two more elements which can be added to the
list. The first is whether there are any detrimental collateral consequences attached to an adverse determination that would add a sting
44 Throughout this discussion, the word "penal" will refer to those offenses that constitute sixth amendment "criminal prosecutions." "Penal" may also refer to common
attributes of that type of offense, such as "penal" sanctions. "Penal" and "criminal"
are thus synonyms. "Offense" is used in the sense of a violation of a stated norm expressed in a statute for which the state may take some form of action against the
offender. "Offenses" may be either criminal or civil. Whatever form or action is available to the state is referred to as the "sanction." Where the word "punishment" is used,
it refers to one of the various purposes of a criminal sanction.
45372 U.S. at 168-69 (and cases cited). See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 277 (1866), for an example of the interplay between the type of offense, the
nature of its punishment, and the intent of the legislature that drafted the statute.
46 "Here, although we are convinced that application of these criteria to the face of
the statute supports the conclusion that they are punitive, a detailed examination along
such lines is unnecessary." 372 U.S. at 169.
47 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 n.30 (1968). Cf. Note, Legislative Purpose and Federal Constitutional Adjudication, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1887, 1889
n.6 (1970).
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to the sanction beyond what the court metes out. 48 Certain of these
consequences are unique to the criminal justice system. Thus, the presence of an arrest record that may be disseminated to law enforcement
agencies or to others would be a highly significant factor in any analysis
of the criminal character of an offense. Other consequences, such as
loss of a privilege, are less indicative of the criminal process-since
their occurrence is almost as frequent in a civil context. The second
additional factor lies closer to the realm of the philosopher than to that
of the judge. Though hard to define, it deserves inclusion because it
attempts to express the essential nature of the difference between a
criminal law and a civil one:
[W]e can say readily enough what a "crime" is. It is not simply anything which a legislature chooses to call a "crime." It
is not simply antisocial conduct which public officers are given
a responsibility to suppress. It is not simply any conduct to
which a legislature chooses to attach a "criminal" penalty. It
is conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur
of the moral condemnaa formal and solemn pronouncement
49
tion of the community.
This notion of looking to the nature of the offense to determine
whether it is serious enough to require certain procedural rights for the
benefit of the defendant finds precedent in the jury right cases. The
Supreme Court has held that right to a jury does not apply to petty
offenses. 5" Thus, the question in that situation is whether the offense is
a non-petty crime, whereas the question here is whether it is a crime
at all.
The Court in the jury trial cases eventually seized on the device of
looking at the severity of the maximum authorized sentence, or where
no maximum penalty is authorized, of looking at the severity of the
48 Such consequences may involve the loss of a valuable privilege, the disability to
enter certain professions, the presence of an arrest or conviction record, or an adverse
effect on a collateral proceeding-such as parole revocation-that would result in a
consequence serious enough in itself to qualify as penal. It also includes non-institutionalized consequences, such as difficulty in obtaining employment. See generally Sibron
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (Court acknowledges adverse collateral consequences
for criminal convictions).
49
Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 405 (1958).
50 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970) (petty offense if authorized sentence is six months or less); Duncan v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (distinguished serious from petty offense concerning the right to jury trial as applied to the
several states); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937) (established view
that petty offenses may be tried without a jury).
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penalty actually imposed, as an "objective indication of the seriousness with which society regards the offense."'" The length of the maximum term of imprisonment provided an easily applicable benchmark,
and the Court determined that where either the maximum sentence or
the sentence actually imposed is more than six months, the offense is
52
per se not a petty one.
Even when the maximum sentence is less than six months, however,
the nature of the offense (whether it was malum in se, or indictable at
common law) may indicate that society views it as non-petty. In District of Columbia v. Colts,5 3 the Court held that a jury trial was required for a charge of reckless driving carrying a maximum authorized
penalty for the first offense of $100 or 30 days in jail. The Court stated
that the offense was an "act of such obvious depravity that to characterize it as a petty offense would be to shock the general -moral
sense." 5 While decisions concerning the moral sense will always be
easier to make if an objective benchmark-such as the maximum punishment-is established, there still remains an area of conduct to which
such judgments can be attached without reference to objective manifestations like a six month per se rule. 55
There are, of course, many directives that remain in the criminal
codes but are rarely enforced precisely because there is no sense of
community moral condemnation behind them. The fact, however, that
this moral factor is not definitive does not deprive it of all utility. To
the extent that the other eight factors point in the same direction as this
last, more philosophical one, a decision as to whether the offense falls
under the sixth amendment is on firmer ground.
51 Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969). Accord, Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 159-61 (1968); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628
(1937).
52Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 150 n.3 (1969) (by analogy to 18 U.S.C. § 1
(1970). The majority measured the six months not as to the probation, but as to the
time of actual confinement. The dissent argued that this was an unfortunate retreat from
the recent decisions in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968); and Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379-80 (1966). The
dissenters would stand by the six month maximum, whether it be by prison, probation,
or both. Furthermore, they said the majority's "focus of probation is not on how society views the offense, but on how the sentencing judge views the offender". 395 U.S.
at 158.
53 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
54 Id. at 73.
5 Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (state practice of obtaining
evidence held unconstitutional as conduct that shocks the conscience); Kamisar and
Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy
Questions, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1, 68-70 (1963).
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III. CLASSES OF OFFENSES
In attempting to weigh the previously enumerated factors against
each other in practice, one can identify four different classes of offenses
to which this analysis may be applied. The offenses are classified according to their label and the type of sanction which they impose-since
these two characteristics are the most obvious features of any offense.
First are those offenses labeled criminal, and punishable by either
imprisonment or a combination of imprisonment and fine.
Second, are offenses also involving imprisonment but labeled civil.
Third, are those offenses not punishable by imprisonment but classified by the legislature (or theretofore treated by the judiciary) as criminal.
Fourth, are those offenses whose maximum authorized sanction does
not include imprisonment, and are legislatively or judicially classified
as civil.
The discussion of these four types of offenses will illuminate the
possibilities in each class for either:
(1) judicial recognition that they are not sixth amendment crimes or
(2) legislative decriminalization with the subsequent creation of a
civil sanction.
A. Class One: CriminalImprisonment
This class is the easiest to categorize. So long as the offense is officially labeled and dealt with as criminal, and so long as imprisonment
is a possible consequence, then the requirement of counsel will remain
with respect to all proceedings under such a statute.
It is clear that the presence of the sanction of imprisonment for violation of a law is a consequence that has profound implications in terms
of the application of the sixth amendment. 6 Imprisonment is, after all,
the most typically penal sanction.5 7 If an offense permits imprisonment
as a sanction, then all those charged with its violation are subject to a
penal proceeding. 8 The judgment of society contained in the maximum
56

See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).

57 See generally H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 273

(1968)
[hereinafter cited as PACKER].
58 This holds true as well for offenses which permit imprisonment only after a second
or succeeding violation. The proposition that statutes which permit imprisonment only
after a second or succeeding violation are criminal for the purpose of the application of
the sixth amendment's right to counsel is supported on two counts. First, if a first conviction forms an indispensable element of a subsequent jail term, then counsel is no
less important at the first trial than at the subsequent one. Also, even statutes without
such an express provision are applied as if one existed-prior convictions often determine which defendants get the infrequent jail term. Thus, if the proposition stated in
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permissible sanction is sufficient to indicate that the matter is grave
enough to be labeled a crime. The standard of maximum, as opposed
to actual, sentence was used by the Supreme Court as the test of
whether a criminal offense was petty or not. 59 It serves just as well as
the benchmark of whether an offense is criminal in the first place.
Whether an offense is criminal or not is determined by the way in
which society treats and views the prohibited conduct, not by what
actually occurs to the defendant at sentencing. 0 Someone convicted of
assault and battery who receives a punishment other than imprisonment
has not been subjected to a civil proceeding merely because he did not
end up in jail.
B. Class Two: Civil Imprisonment
Once the formal labels and procedures surrounding a criminal prosecution are removed, the mere presence of a sanction of imprisonment
61
may, or may not, indicate that the offense is in fact a criminal one.
The discussion of municipal ordinance violations has already provided one example of a proceeding improperly labeled civil that may
result in loss of liberty. 2 Other areas exist as well, in which the civil
label and the consequences of imprisonment are mistakenly matched.
In People v. Letterio, 3 a defendant sentenced to 42 days in jail and
a $1,030 fine for repeated speeding violations challenged his conviction
on the ground that he had not been afforded the right to appointment
of counsel. The New York Court of Appeals justified its decision that
there was no constitutional requirement of appointment of counsel in
traffic cases on two grounds.
First was the label put on the offense. The New York Vehicle and
Traffic Law provided that:

the text holds for statutes without a second offender limitation on imprisonment, it
should hold as well for those with such a limitation. But cf. Wood v. Superintendent

Caroline Correctional Unit, 355 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Va. 1973) (two prior convictions
imposing fines of $6.23 and $26.25 were minor and assistance of counsel unnecessary,
even though these convictions were used to enhance the punishment in a subsequent

conviction).
591Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969).
60 District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937)
(engaging without a license
in the business of a dealer in second-hand personal property was an offense with a

relatively inoffensive moral quality); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930)
(act described was a grave offense).
61 See United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, (7th Cir. 1974).
62
See Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 174, 323 P.2d 614, 617 (1958); McQUILLAN, supra note 32.
63 16 N.Y.2d 307, 213 N.E.2d 670, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368
(1965),
U.S. 911 (1966).

cert. denied, 384
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A traffic infraction is not a crime, and the punishment imposed therefore shall not be deemed for any purpose a penal
or criminal punishment and shall not affect or impair the
credibility as a witness or otherwise of any person convicted
64
thereof.
The fact that the defendant ended up with a not insubstantial jail sentence was glossed over by the use of another label:
The penalty is something in the nature of a community sanction or civil penalty but it is not in any respect punishment
for a crime. There may be a fine and, in extreme but very rare
cases, a jail sentence, but these too are similar to certain civil
compulsions which the law exerts. 65
The second rationale relied on by the court in Letterio was that
the practical result of assigning counsel to defendants in traffic
cases would be chaotic. Assigning counsel in but 1% of these
millions of cases would require the services of nearly half the
attorneys registered in the State.66
One response to this concern, although directed to the legislature and
not the courts, is that if there is no need to attach a criminal label to
traffic offenses, why must the possibility of imprisonment-which is
rarely used-exist at all? It brings one back, full circle, to the resource
allocation problem mentioned previously. If the costs of implementing
the constitutional safeguards that are required when there attaches a
criminal sanction, such as imprisonment, are so high that they outweigh
the possible benefits from the infrequent use of the sanction, then a
reevaluation is called for. Traffic offenses present just such an oppor67
tunity.
Aside from situations like Letterio which involve imprisonment for
violation of an allegedly civil prohibition, there exists a large category
of civil proceedings which nevertheless will result in loss of liberty. 8
The results may not be a jail sentence, but they may be equally as restrictive of one's personal liberty, considering the effect on the indi64

N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 155 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
65 16 N.Y.2d at 313, 213 N.E.2d at 672, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 372 (Bergan, J., concurring). Accord, People v. Bliss, 53 Misc. 2d 472, 278 N.Y.S. 732 (Allegany County
1967). Contra, Blake v. Municipal Court, 242 Cal. App. 2d 731, 51 Cal. Rptr. 771
(1st D., 1966) (extending right to counsel to traffic violations).
66 16 N.Y.2d at 312, 213 N.E.2d at 672, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
67 See text accompanying notes 118-19 infra.
68 Cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 n.ll (Powell, J., concurring) (wide
range of civil disabilities may result from misdemeanor convictions-forfeiture of public office, disqualification for a licensed profession, and loss of pension rights); Project,
The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929 (1970).

1975]

SCOPE OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

vidual. 69 Civil commitment, whether for mental illness, alcoholism, drug
dependence, or communicable disease, is such an area. In this situation,
though, the clash of the civil label and the drastic consequence is resolved in a different manner than was the case with traffic violations
or municipal ordinance violations. The reason for this result goes beyond
the label, to the motivation underlying the sanction of imprisonment.
A means for rationally limiting the sixth amendment with respect to
these proceedings can be found in the distinction between sanctions
imposed as a consequence of "prohibited" conduct, and those connected
with "prohibited" status. Criminal sanctions generally are reserved for
70
violators of stated legal norms that define prohibited conduct. Civil
commitment, on the other hand, is intended only for those whose status,
be it mental or physical, indicates a need for societal treatment. Within
this latter category, the conduct of the individual is only evidence of
the underlying status that is the ultimate cause for concern.73
The distinction being drawn between status and conduct finds its
eventual root in the purpose of the sanction. This much is recognized
explicitly in the factors spelled out in the Mendoza-Martinez case dealing with whether the operation of the sanction will promote the aims
of punishment or some other ends. The example of civil commitment
offers an opportunity to examine these factors in context.
While any attempt to pinpoint the purpose behind criminal sanctions
is a heady task, 2 at least consensus can be gathered around the various
elements that constitute, to one degree or another, the possible purposes
that can be served. 73 Retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation all find expression in one facet or another of the criminal law.
Civil commitment, on the other hand, does not involve either retribution
or deterrence, very rarely involves incapacitation,7 4 and necessarily requires rehabilitation.7"
69 See PACKER, supra note 57, at 25.
70 See the definition of "offense" at note 44, supra. See also United States v. Eaton,

144 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1892).
71 This distinction is discussed at greater length in PACKER, supra note 57, at 77-79.
72
See H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAw 3 (1968).
73

See, e.g., In Re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 650, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1973); M. FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES 106 (1973); PACKER, supra note 57, at 35-61.
74 Part of the rationale for civil commitment of certain mentally-ill persons is the
danger they represent to themselves or others. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-545(b)
(1973). See generally Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); In Re Ballay, 482
F.2d at 657 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories
and Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1288 (1966).
75
See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Overholser v.
Lynch, 288 F.2d 388, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Bailey & Pyfer, Deprivation of Liberty
and Right to Treatment, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 519 (1974); Bazelon, Implementing
the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742 (1969).
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Modern day penology shares with civil commitment a dedication to
the rehabilitative ideal. Certain types of civil commitment share with
criminal imprisonment the attribute of incapacitation. But it is retribution and deterrence that set criminal "imprisonment" apart from civil
"imprisonment." Both of these goals require, for utilitarian as well as
for humanitarian reasons, that the sanctions they impose be restricted
to culpable conduct as opposed to a mere status. Indeed, the argument
is made that the unique moral judgments embodied in the criminal law
would be rendered useless if the distinction between conduct and status
was not maintained.70
The fact that the philosophical rationales behind the criminal sanction are not the moving forces behind civil commitment does not necessarily compel a conclusion that there is no right to counsel for civil
committees. Quite the contrary, application of a due process analysisapart from any sixth amendment consideration--demands that counsel
be appointed. In the context of a proceeding with a consequence of such
magnitude no other conclusion would be consonant with the balancing
of interests involved in a due process analysis.77 In fact, the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has imposed on mental health commitments, as a matter of due process, the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, traditionally an attribute only Of sixth amendment
proceedings.7"
There are of course attempts within the criminal law to prohibit a
certain status: vagrancy and narcotics addiction are modern examples.
Such offenses, though, are finding themselves on the losing end of recent
constitutional attacks. 7' This tide of events results from a recognition
that such crimes encroach upon the principal of individual culpability
found in Anglo-American criminal law. This safeguard is expressed in
several doctrines of the criminal law, such as mental responsibility and
duress. 8° Even the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment has been held to contain a limit on the use of the criminal
76 See Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 107, 150: "The
fact is that the processes of criminal justice are used or misused, for purposes that
have no odor of criminality except that which resides in the use of the word itself. It
makes trivial that concept of criminality to apply it to such minor infractions of the
law." See generally H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 261-64 (1968).
7
7See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1097-99 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
78
In Re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also In Re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970) (reasonable doubt standard required in a juvenile proceeding).
79
See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (vagrancy); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (narcotics addiction). But see Powell v. Texas, 392

U.S. 514 (1968).
80 See generally H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1-27 (1968).

1975]

SCOPE OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

sanction divorced from individual culpability."' It is this doctrine that
is so violated by crimes of status.
Perhaps the most significant area in which status and conduct seem
to merge together is in the juvenile justice system. The Supreme Court
has held that a juvenile court action is not a sixth amendment prosecution.8" This result is justified on the grounds of a gloss placed over
juvenile proceedings: namely the idea that the purpose of juvenile court
is to provide rehabilitation for persons whose status is that of a "delinquent" or a "person in need of supervision. 8' 3 The Court did not find
compelling the fact that most often it is only when a juvenile commits
what would otherwise be a crime that the determination of a "delinquent" status is made. Such a view falls into the trap of stopping at
the label:
Because the legislature dictates that a child who commits a
felony shall be called a delinquent does not change the nature
of the crime. Murder is murder; robbery is robbery-they
are both criminal offenses, not civil, regardless and independent of the age of the doer. In view of the potential loss of
liberty at stake . . . all the provisions of the Bill of Rights,

including trial by jury, must prevail.84

When imprisonment, whatever the label, is a possible consequence
of a delinquency proceeding, the Court's treatment of the application of
the sixth amendment is at odds with the analysis put forward in this
discussion. This divergence is perhaps explained by the fond hopes of
the Justices for the redemptive/rehabilitative side of the juvenile court.
Moreover, the distinction may be one of form and not substance, since
the Court applies to juvenile hearings almost all of the safeguards attendant upon a sixth amendment "criminal proceeding""5 with the major
exception of a jury trial.8 6
81 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962); PACKER, supra note 57,
at 77.
82McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
83 1d. at 539-40.
84 Opinion of a Rhode Island family court judge, cited by Mr. Justice Douglas in an
appendix to his dissenting opinion in McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 563, 571-72.
85 See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In
Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (the right of counsel, the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses).
Indeed, the Court has begun to look past the surface of paternalism to the substrata
of retribution and deterrence represented in juvenile commitments. With respect to the
right to counsel, the Court has analyzed on this aspect of juvenile courts in terms that
could very well fit a sixth amendment framework:
[The Constitution] requires that in respect of proceedings to determine
delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution in which
the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parent must be no-
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C. Class Three: Criminal, No Imprisonment
The situation changes somewhat with the third class of offenses.,'
Although imprisonment is not a possibility, these offenses are still treated
as crimes by the state. Such offenses are candidates for either judicial
disregard of the label, or legislative change in the substance of the proceedings. Either route would eliminate the necessity for application of
the sixth amendment right to counsel.
Judicial disregard of the label raises a preliminary question. It seems
fair to ask why, if the state chooses to call a proceeding criminal, one
should look behind the label; since a contrary conclusion will only deprive the defendant of certain safeguards. In other words, if the state
adopts a label that on its face subjects it to certain restrictions, why
then should a court-or anyone else but the state institution that adopted
the label-have any incentive to go behind it?
One reason is because the problem often crops up in a context that
involves no label at all. Even if one were to classify offenses as crimes
on the basis of how they are legislatively and judicially treated-a view
which is not altogether uncommons8 -the issue would still not be completely settled because these institutions themselves are sometimes unable
to categorize the offense:
[a proceeding to enforce a municipal ordinance] is therefore
a quasi-civil and criminal action. Partaking of some of the
features of each, its similitude to either is not complete.89
Even if the label is clear, consistency demands looking at substance
rather than form in both directions. In the administration of a criminal
justice system, such consistency is a virtue in itself. The fact that the
state chooses to label some offenses as crimes, even if there is no substance behind the label, should-in order to protect the individualcreate a heavy presumption that they are indeed sixth amendment
prosecutions. However, if the nature of the conduct and the collateral
consequences of an adverse determination do not contain any of the
tified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them
or, if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed
to represent the child.
In Re Gault, 387 U.S 1, 41 (1967) (emphasis added).
86 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971),
87 Parking violations, municipal ordinance violations, and zoning violations are representative of the Class Three offense.
88 "The criminal act may have serious social consequences, or it may be disputable
whether it has any bad social consequences at all; but it is a crime if so treated by the
courts." Williams, The Definition of Crime, 8 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 107, 123-24
(1955).
89 Stevens v. Kansas City, 146 Mo. 460, 465, 48 S.W. 658. 659 (1898).
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indicia of criminality, then these prosecutions may be conducted under
rules of procedure that need not necessarily measure up to the requirements of the sixth amendment.
Examples of offenses that will be likely candidates for judicial disregard of a label are most common in the field of traffic regulation. In
Massachusetts, for example, one who receives a parking ticket can send
in the amount of the fine in a proceeding that is explicitly deemed not
criminal.9 0 If a hearing is desired, though, state law labels it a criminal
proceeding, 9 but a functional analysis suggests an opposite conclusion.
This proceeding can result only in a fine. The prohibition involved is a
type of regulatory provision, not requiring scienter, which falls outside
the philosophical definition of a crime. 92
Massachusetts recognizes in its statutes that even some nonparking
motor vehicle violations that technically fall into the category of criminal prosecutions as defined by the legislature need not be afforded the
constitutional safeguards attendant upon felony prosecutions. Those
offenses for which the punishment is not more than fifty dollars and
does not include a sentence of imprisonment may be handled by the
defendant entirely through the mail, by sending in the fine. This acts
as a waiver of any constitutional rights he might have. 93 Applying less
than the full blown constitutional standards regarding waiver to traffic
offenses not only makes for administrative efficiency, but acts as a
recognition that these offenses are not regular (sixth amendment)
"crimes." A court faced with the question of appointment of counsel
in a proceeding which has as little relation to its criminal label as the
Massachusetts parking scheme could thus decline to appoint counsel
and yet be fully in accord with the sixth amendment.
The prospect of judicial scrutiny of existing criminal codes to determine if certain minor offenses are not in fact sixth amendment criminal
prosecutions is suggested by a passage from Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in the Argersinger decision:
[T]he fact that traffic charges technically fall within the category of "criminal prosecutions" does not necessarily mean that
90

MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 20A (1969).
91 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 20 (1969); Commonwealth v. Marder, 346 Mass.
408, 193 N.E.2d 695 (1963). The court recognized that this deters defendants from
seeking a hearing, and thus might be invalid if applied to more serious offenses. 346
Mass. at 411, 193 N.E.2d at 697.
92 Moreover, the collateral consequences of a conviction are negligible. Although
records of parking violations subject to a hearing are sent to the registrar of motor
vehicles, there is no automatic suspension of any license. Thus, such parking violations
are not sixth amendment crimes, even though the state labels them "criminal."
qMASs.
•1
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 20A (1969).
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many of them will be brought into the class where imprisonment actually occurs. (emphasis added)."
The unstated assumption is that since no imprisonment occurs, counsel
is not required.
The decision, though, offers no reason why the presence or absence
of imprisonment should be the determinative factor. Indeed, as noted
by Mr. Justice Powell:
The thrust of the Court's position indicates ... that when the
decision [on extending right to counsel] must be made, the
rule will be extended to all petty offense cases except perhaps
the most minor traffic violations.9 5
If the majority opinion never intended for imprisonment to remain the
benchmark, some other explanation must exist for the comments of
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. -Justice Powell about why counsel is not
required for traffic offenders. The italicized language in the Douglas
quote may offer a clue. If by use of the qualification "technically," Mr.
Justice Douglas abbreviated the thesis of this discussion-that "technical" labels do not determine the bounds of the sixth amendment-then
the matter is made more clear. The Argersinger opinion would then
merely recognize that certain offenses such as traffic violations may be
heard without counsel because they are not sixth amendment crimes.
Of course, the language might mean that even though traffic offenses
do fall within the class protected by the sixth amendment, the assistance
of counsel clause is concerned with only "nontechnical" criminal prosecutions. This rationale appears suspiciously like the petty offense limitation on the jury trial clause, which the Court expressly rejected as a
proper model for right to counsel. 6
Courts have, in the past, looked beyond a "criminal" label in order
to reach some decision concerning the application of constitutional
rights. One example of judicial willingness to disregard labels is found
in an opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court, People v. Stout.97 The
court held that although complaints for disorderly conduct and fastdriving violations that resulted in a $100 fine were entitled "criminal
complaints" they were in effect only the customary forms for initiating
a civil procedure to recover a penalty for violation of an ordinance.
As such, the right afforded an accused in a criminal prosecution by the
407 U.S. at 38.
1d. at 51.
96
Id. at 30-31.
97 41 I1.2d 292, 242 N.E.2d 264 (1968).
94
95
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state constitution "to demand the nature and cause of the accusation"
did not apply.

98

The Stout decision, unfortunately, does not represent an example of
a close analysis of the substance of the offense behind the label. It is
questionable, for example, whether the disorderly conduct charge would
be able to withstand such an examination and still be deemed civil rather
than criminal. The opinion does not provide any background on the
question. It does demonstrate, however, that the technique of looking
behind the label in order to move from "criminal" to "civil" is not entirely novel.99
This third class of offenses contains crimes that are not serious enough
to warrant imprisonment. These offenses, though, may still carry with
them a sufficient degree of criminality-considering the history of the
offense, purpose of the sanction, and collateral consequences-to remain
sixth amendment crimes. But legislatures can remove from this class
those offenses that do not justify the costs of full blown sixth amendment procedural safeguards. In effect, by making the proper changes,
the legislature can turn a class three offense into a class four offense.
In order to understand how practicable such a procedure might be, we
must first examine class four offenses.
D. Class Four: Civil Offenses
Of the possible solutions to the resource problem created by extending the right to counsel to all criminal defendants, legislative decriminalization is perhaps the most promising, since it has the widest reach.
The number of defendants who would clog the courts with potential
demands for counsel for such minor crimes as parking violations is
staggering. 100
The decision to remove an offense from the criminal statutes does
not necessarily mean that the underlying conduct would no longer be
subject to any control. Although there are certainly ripe candidates in
98 Id.

99 If the technique of judicial scrutiny beyond a label is thus a practicable one, it will
nevertheless not serve to alleviate the resource problems created by extension of the
right to counsel to all sixth amendment criminal defendants. Too few criminal offenses
are so mislabeled. The primary technique for relieving the crunch will be within the
province of the legislatures.
100 See text accompanying note 17 supra. In Village of Park Forest v. Bragg, 74 Ill.
App. 2d 87, 220 N.E.2d 61 (1966), the court warned that to class ordinance violations
as criminal proceedings and thus subject them to the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure would cause "an administrative and procedural holocaust." 220 N.E.2d at
63-4.
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the criminal codes for complete decontrol-notably morals offenses' 01
-the alternative of some sort of civil sanction may make the task of
pruning the criminal statutes more palatable to a legislature.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in the majority opinion in Argersinger, recognized the viability of this avenue by noting that a partial solution, "peculiarly within the province of state and local legislatures," to the problem
raised by the decision would be to transfer minor offenses from the
court system to specialized administrative bodies. 0 2
There presently exist, of course, many types of prohibited conduct
for which a non-imprisonment sanction is provided that are expressly
labeled civil. 10 3 Such civil violations may after an analysis of the procedures they involve and the sanctions they carry in fact fall outside the
sixth amendment. Perhaps the most striking feature of these offenses is
that they are not a part of the formal machinery of the criminal justice
system. The fact that an offense is dealt with outside these channels
is not determinative, but often is an indication of both the historical
context of the offense'0 4 and the way in which it is viewed by the com105
munity.
The type of sanction is significant as well. The range of sanctions
for civil violations is perhaps wider than that associated with crimes.
Suspension of a driver's license, disbarment from the practice of law,
or even the issuance of an injunction are all civil sanctions of a sort,
and all have historically developed from non-criminal roots.'
Perhaps the most common sanction for violation of civil offenses is
a fine. While a jail sentence may be the archetypical penal sanction, a
money judgment is most often the mark of a civil suit. Indeed, at com101 The American Bar Association Special Committee on Crime Prevention recommended that:
Regulations of various types of conduct which harm no one other than
those involved (e.g., public drunkenness, narcotics addiction, vagrancy,
and deviant sexual behavior) should be transferred to non-judicial entities,
such as detoxification centers, narcotics treatment centers and social service agencies. The handling of other non-serious offenses, such as housing
code and traffic violations, should be transferred to specialized administrative bodies.
ABA REPORT, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON URBAN CRIME iv (1972).
102 407 U.S. at 38 n.9.
103 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 233 (1970) (civil remedy of one dollar per barrel available
to United States against any person using less than a standard barrel for apples). A
legislature seeking to convert apple packing from criminal to civil regulation must,
however, take care that the procedure set up after the change does not run afoul of a
substantive sixth amendment analysis.
104 See text accompanying note 45 supra.
105 See text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
106 See, e.g., Hecht Company v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944)
("The historic injunctive process was designed to deter, not to punish"); Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883)
(jury trial. not required in disbarment proceeding because of its civil nature).
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mon law the presence of the possibility of imprisonment for nonpayment
of a fine was an indication that the character of the offense was criminal."' The United States Supreme Court has taken much the same view
concerning the effect of the presence or absence of imprisonment.
[A] prosecution . . . even if the plaintiff be the Government

[for] a judgment "for money only, and not [for] a judgment
which directly involves the personal safety of the defendant,
is not.

. .

within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment ...

a

0

criminal prosecution. (emphasis added)

Such civil fines can serve two purposes, compensation and regulation.
Those intended as compensation have a lineage direct from tort or contract damages, and are easily distinguished from criminal sanctions by
their relationship to the amount of damage caused by the party involved. 0 9 However, civil fines have historically been used in a regulatory
sense as well." 0 Fines such as these bear no relationship to the amount
of damages caused, and on first glance seem different only by way of
label from ordinary criminal fines."'
One can get mired in the abstract distinction between a regulatory
provision and one intended for punishment,"' but the ultimate purpose
is the same: to obtain conformity to stated legal norms. However, even
though the purpose behind such civil fines may be just as coercive as
that found with criminal fines, the Supreme Court has indicated that
the Congress has wide latitude in determining whether to use a civil
action or not to recover a "pecuniary penalty for commission of a public
offense. 11 3 Thus, the mere fact that a civil fine is not intended as compensation is not sufficient to convert an otherwise civil proceeding into
a sixth amendment prosecution. This result, anomalous perhaps on its
face, is best understood in the well established historical context of civil
fines themselves. Fines that impose money penalties that may be recovered by civil actions were always recognized at common law as not
being a part of the criminal statutes."'
107 BROOM, COMMENTARIES

ON THE

COMMON

LAW

867-68 (1873).

108 United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 42 (1914), quoting United States v. Zucker,
161 U.S. 475, 481 (1896).
109See, e.g., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148,

153 (1956);

United

States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551 (1943).
110 See, e.g., United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. at 40; note 142 infra.
"' Compare 232 U.S. at 40 (civil-regulatory fine) with Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.

Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909) (criminal fine).
112See, e.g., PACKER, supra note 57, at 23-31. Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958).
113 232 U.S. at 46.
114Atcheson v. Everitt, I Cowp. 382, 391 (1776). These actions were called "penal
actions", 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL OF ENGLAND 4 (1883), and
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The Supreme Court has given explicit recognition to the fact that
such proceedings do not constitute sixth amendment prosecutions. No
less a defender of a broad application of sixth amendment rights than
Mr. Justice Black noted:
My view does not require a conclusion that every act which
may lead to "miniscule" sanctions by the Government is a
"crime" . . . There may be instances in which certain conduct

is punished by fines or other sanctions in circumstances that
would not make that conduct criminal. Not all official sanctions are imposed in criminal proceedings. 115
There has been a recent revival of interest in the use of civil fines for
offenses removed from the criminal statutes because they do not require
the machinery of the criminal justice system or the moral condemnation
of the community embodied in the criminal law. 116 The technique has
been to place these offenses under the jurisdiction of a civil or administrative body." 7 The obvious benefit of such a procedure from the point
of view of this discussion is that the strict sixth amendment procedures
concerning mandatory appointment of counsel can thereby be avoided
in situations where they are not needed. However, in order to successfully avoid the cumbersome machinery required by the sixth amendment, careful attention must be paid to both the type of offense involved
and the procedures that accompany the newly created violation. Among
the offenses which have been or may be subject to such reclassification
are traffic offenses,"' public drunkenness," 9 and gambling. 2 °
were brought as actions in debt or assumpsit. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 158.
This use of the word "penal" should not be confused with its general use in this article.
115 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 76 n.2 (1970).
116 See, e.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS

AND

[hereinafter
cited as NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION] § 8.2 (1973); Barrett, Criminal Justice: The
Problem of Mass Production, reprinted in JONES, THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE
LAW EXPLOSION 85 (1965)
("[w]henever possible civil penalties with simplified procedures to collect them should be substituted to handle those [offenses] which do not
involve moral considerations ...").
117 See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRF. LAW § 155 (McKinney Supp. 1972); Basner, Some
Comments on Practical Aspects in the Functioning of the Administrative Adjudication
Bureau, 35 ALB. L. REV. 443 (1971).
118 See, e.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 116. While the proceedings
would not be conducted subject to the sixth amendment, the Report suggests that the
difference between them and other civil actions be recognized by a somewhat higher
burden
of proof, i.e., clear and convincing evidence.
119 See PACKER, supra note 57, at 345. See also NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION,
GOALS,

REPORT

OF

THE

NATIONAL

CONFERENCE

supra note 116.
120 See PACKER, supra note 57, at 347.

ON

CRIMINAL

JUSTICE,
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The Model Penal Code has demonstrated a sensitivity to the concerns
pressed above with respect to the type of offense and the nature of the
civil proceeding. Section 1.04 of the Code has proposed a classification
of civil offense called a "violation." Violations are punishable only by
fine or forfeiture, and "conviction of a violation shall not give rise to
any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal
offense." '2' Commentary to this section makes clear the type of offenses
which are eligible for such civil treatment: "[the] purpose of the Code
[is] to employ penal sanctions only with respect to conduct warranting
the moral condemnation implicit in the concept of a crime. ' 122 This
justification for the use of a criminal sanction echoes the moral factor
1 23
in the definition of sixth amendment crimes mentioned earlier.
A proposal for a new criminal code in Massachusetts adopts the
Model Penal Code's classification of offenses. 1 24 The proposed code contains 28 "violations," ranging from disorderly conduct to spitting. 125
Such pruning of existing criminal statutes represents a re-evaluation
long overdue in terms not only of reflecting changing community standards, but also of efficient use of the criminal process.
In order to be effective in removing an offense from the scope of the
sixth amendment, the legislature must end up with a procedure that is
able to withstand an independent analysis according to the type suggested by the Mendoza-Martinez case.' 2, In addition, the collateral consequences of a criminal prosecution must be exercised from the resulting
procedure if it is to be truly non-criminal. Arrest records or civil disabilities attendant upon conviction of a crime are two such examples.
Of course, whenever an individual has a significant stake in the outcome
of an administrative determination, be the end result the loss of a welfare
benefit or the suspension of a driver's license, the state is bound to afford
the requisite due process. Whether the appointment of counsel is necessary under this type of analysis may be determined by a more flexible
case by case standard than the sixth amendment would permit. However, even a judicious selection of the most likely candidates for administrative rather than criminal treatment would have a tremendous effect
on the workload of the criminal courts.12 7
121 MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 1.04 (tent. draft no. 2, 1959).

§ 1.04, Comment (tent, draft no. 2, 1959).
123 See text accompanying note 50 supra.
124 PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE OF MASSACHUSETrS c.268, § 3 et seq. (1972).
125 Id. at c.270 § 12.
126 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
127 See DOLLARS AND SENSE, supra note 17. Just removing minor traffic cases from
the scope of the sixth amendment would eliminate the spectre of perhaps as many as
122 MODEL PENAL CODE
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E. Dual-Track Systems
The temptation when tinkering with the new toy of decriminalization
and the attendant creation of administrative sanctions is to retain the
best of both the civil and criminal worlds. Why not solve the problem
posed by extension of right to counsel to all criminal defendants by
creating a dual track: a system where the identical conduct is subject
to either a criminal or a civil sanction, at the option of the prosecutor?
Under this system, the question of when to appoint counsel under the
sixth amendment would be easy. Whenever the prosecutor chose the
criminal half of the dual track, counsel would be appointed. Otherwise
the proceeding would be civil in nature and the sixth amendment would
not apply.
There are, of course, statutes which make certain types of conduct
the predicate for either criminal or civil action. The Sherman Antitrust
Act is an example. 2 Other dual tracks are found in the operation of
federal revenue laws,' 29 water pollution statutes,'130 and anti-racketeering
laws. 31
Using these statutory schemes as a model, a state legislature might
be persuaded to solve the problems of resource allocation and decriminalization of misdemeanors by retaining criminal proceedings only for
those defendants whom the prosecuting authorities felt warranted such
treatment, while permitting referral of other offenders to an administrative proceeding or a civil trial where the sixth amendment would not
apply. Marijuana laws, for example, could be amended so that the
prosecutor faced with a defendant charged with possession could either
proceed in the normal channels of the criminal justice system, or could
32
try to enforce a civil sanction in a trial court or administrative agency.
12.5 million additional appointments of counsel each year. Id. This estimate is based
on the assumption that one quarter of the total number of cases will involve indigents.
Id. at 1260.
128 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970). Conduct which violates the antitrust laws can be the
subject of either criminal proceedings under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970) or civil proceedings under 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 15(a) (1970).
12926 U.S.C. § 6653 (1970); 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1970).
13033 U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp. 1972).
131 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-64 (1970).
132 Dual-track systems that give the prosecutor the discretion of using either a felony
provision or a misdemeanor provision, where the two are identical except for the
penalty have been ruled a violation of equal protection. See People v. McCullough, 8
Ill. App. 963, 291 N.E.2d 505 (1972). But see Ehrlich v. United States, 238 F.2d 481,
485:
A defendant cannot complain merely because the charge against him is
brought under the statute carrying the more serious penalties where two
statutes punish the same general acts.
See also People v. Williams, 15 I1. App. 3d 294, 304 N.E.2d 150 (1973).
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For the purpose of this discussion, a hypothetical marijuana defendant in the civil track would raise a question of appointment of
counsel. 133 The first argument that our hypothetical defendant might
raise to support his claim that he is entitled to a sixth amendment right
to counsel is that one of the factors relied on by the Supreme Court in
Mendoza-Martinez is present, namely, the underlying conduct is also
the subject of a criminal law.13 1 Since the dual-track situations, by definition, must confront this hurdle it should be examined closely.
When the underlying conduct is already concededly criminal, the
existence of an additional civil sanction in a proceeding that lacks the
specific safeguards attendant upon criminal procedure raises the spectre
of a prosecutor who chooses to use the civil track in order to evade the
requirements of the sixth amendment. 135 For example, if the civil sanction and the criminal sanction were exactly the same, the choice of label
by the prosecutor would strip the defendant of a considerable bundle
of rights while subjecting him to the same risks. Moreover, when con133 If the application of the sixth amendment right to counsel depends on the substance of the proceedings and not the label, the fact that the claim is raised in a civil
track is not dispositive. Of course, even if the proceeding is truly civil, circumstances
might require the appointment of counsel in order to provide the defendant due
process. See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349
F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wisc. 1972) vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); text
accompanying notes 76-78. However, where there is flexibility in the standard for appointment of counsel, not allowed by the sixth amendment, the impact of the resource
question is likely to be far less. See also text accompanying note 20 supra.
134 See text accompanying note 45 supra.
1.-35
Questions concerning the use of a dual track to evade constitutional requirements
arise with respect to provisions of the Bill of Rights other than the sixth amendment.
In One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), the Court faced the
question of whether evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment may be
relied on to sustain a forfeiture of an automobile that had been carrying untaxed liquor.
The state argued that since a forfeiture is a civil proceeding the exclusionary rule
should not apply. The Court disagreed and barred the evidence noting that the forfeiture, though civil, was a greater penalty than the criminal one applicable to the
car's driver. Thus, evasion of the fourth amendment by use of a dual track was prevented.
The fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination also has been the subject of
a dual track case. In United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715
(1971), the Court held unconstitutional a forfeiture statute predicated on activity by
the owner of the property which could not be criminally punished because of the fifth
amendment. The Court cited Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886):
proceedings instituted for the forfeiture of a man's property by reason
of oflenses committed by him, though they may be civil in form are in
their nature criminal. [Emphasis added in United States v,.United States
Coin and Currency.]

Where the basis for the forfeiture, however, is activity which is not the subject
of a separate criminal sanction, there is no dual track problem. Cf. One Lot Emerald
Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
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duct is also the subject of a separate criminal sanction, it is likely to
be of a character that comes closer to the moral definition of a crime
than would otherwise be the case. Thus, on two counts, the existence
of a civil track presents conceptual sixth amendment problems.
In order fora civil track to avoid the requirements of sixth amendment, the balance of the other relevant considerations must outweigh
the fact that the conduct is the subject of a separate criminal provision.
Perhaps the most significant factor in this balance is the exact nature
of the civil sanction that is imposed.
The type of sanction and its purpose are the predominant concerns
of the Mendoza-Martinez analysis.1 3 Moreover, in the dual-track situations that the Supreme Court has considered, these factors form the
basis for those decisions in which the Court has done more than just
look at the label.
Dual-track cases in the Supreme Court have mainly dealt with the
application of the ban on double jeopardy,' but the analysis used to
determine that question, which revolves around whether the civil track
involves "punishment," applies as well to determine whether a sixth
amendment right to counsel is present. 13 Indeed, several dual-track
cases in the Supreme Court have dealt with related issues, such as the
application of a burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 39 or of the
fifth amendment's provision against being called as a witness against
oneself. 4 ' Whatever the specific issue, when the Court has upheld the
civil label of a dual track, it has relied on the grounds that the sanction
was intended not as punishment but as compensation. 141 This distinction
has at times been more a complex exercise in semantics than the basis
for a close analysis. 142 The Court's treatment of this whole problem, in
136

See text accompanying note 45 supra.

137 See, e.g., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956);

United States
ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
138 407 U.S. at 27-40.
139 United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914).
140 Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909); Lees v. United States, 150 U.S.
476 (1893).
141 See Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. at 148-52 (1956); United States
ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. at 551-52 (1943). See also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303
U.S. 391 (1938). In Mitchell, the Court considered a statute that provided that where
a tax deficiency is attributable to fraud with intent to evade the tax, a 50 percent
penalty is assessed. The taxpayer claimed that the penalty constituted double jeopardy
since another code section provided for fine or imprisonment for tax evaders. The
Court rejected the argument because the penalty was, according to the Court, intended
"to reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer's fraud". Id. at 401. Thus the penalty was not criminal and
double jeopardy was inapplicable.
142 In his concurring opinion in Hess, Justice Frankfurter characterized this distinction, for which the Court had cited Helvering, as one of the type of "dialectical subtle-
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fact, has often suffered from lack of a consistent approach. For example,
decisions under identical statutes have determined the issue in contradictory terms. 14' However, the distinction between compensation and
punishment, even if not always put into practice,14 does offer a sound
basis for determining which dual tracks are mere evasions of the sixth
amendment, and which serve a substantively valid purpose.
When the government proceeds against an individual in the context
of a civil sanction which seeks compensatory damages or an injunction,
it acts to vindicate the same interests as a private person, and there is
no reason to label such a proceeding criminal. 4 ' Where the civil action
serves a concededly non-compensatory purpose, then the viability of
dual track with respect to the sixth amendment is in doubt. Compare,
for example, the federal statute on water pollution with the antitrust
and antiracketeering laws. Violators of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act 1 46 are subject to both a criminal penalty of $2,500 to
$25,000 per day or imprisonment for not more than one year or both,
and to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 per day.' 4 7 The antitrust 1 48 and anti-racketeering' 4 9 laws, on the other hand, provide only
compensatory civil fines or injunctions as the civil sanctions for offenses
which also constitute criminal violations.' The civil fine connected with
a violation of the water pollution laws is no different from the criminal
fine which is also allowed, except that the proceedings for its enforceties" which are too subtle when the problem is one of safeguarding human interests.
He said that if the Court's distinction between punitive and compensatory fines were
valid, defendants ought to be allowed to prove "that as a matter of fact, the forfeiture
and double damages are punitive because they exceed any amount that could reasonably be regarded as the equivalent of compensation for the Government's loss." id. at
554.
14' Compare Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476, 480 (1893) with Hepner v. United
States, 213 U.S. 103, 112 (1909).
144 See United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914), in which the Court found an
action for a $1000 penalty under the Alien Immigration Act to be a civil action even
though no mention was made of any intent to compensate.
145 The analogy between actions by a private party and by the Government has been
carried to the extreme of Supreme Court dicta indicating that Congress could provide,
as a civil sanction in a dual track, for treble damages, since these are commonly afforded to private individuals. 317 U.S. at 550-51. It is submitted that government should
not be permitted to seek such non-compensatory damages in the civil half of a dual
track.
14633 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 1972).
147 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c), (d) (Supp. 1972).
148 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
149 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-64 (1970).
150 It is interesting to note that where the government may seek a civil fine which
does not bear a relationship to its actual damages as a result of a violation of the antitrust statutes-such as in the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970)the underlying violation is not the subject of a dual-track criminal sanction.
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ment are subject to less stringent standards. Since the purpose behind
the two exactions is the same, the ability to use the civil procedure
merely to avoid compliance with the sixth amendment is a tempting
possibility for a prosecutor. This possibility should be avoided by a
proper sixth amendment analysis. In short, a dual track which has a
non-compensatory civil sanction is less likely to survive a reasoned
inquiry.
The final factor which is likely to have a major effect in the balance
with respect to dual tracks is the nature of the underlying offense. The
most widely recognized dual track, the antitrust laws, represents prohibited conduct which carries with it a lesser degree of moral condemnation than the more traditional common law crimes.' 5' The antiracketeering dual track, for example, represents the other extreme of
moral turpitude.' 5 2
In conclusion, the option of creating a dual track to deal with the
problems engendered by extending right to counsel to all criminal defendants is a restricted one. The civil track must be more than just a
means to avoid constitutional safeguards while achieving the same result
as the criminal track.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This discussion has tried to illustrate that a close analysis of the term
"criminal prosecution" encompassed within the sixth amendment, from
the perspective of both the legislature and the courts will serve a not
so incidental purpose of illuminating the resource problems surrounding
right to counsel. Once one removes the stumbling block of having to
151 See NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1960).

Public opinion is notably less apt to applaud the punishment of parking
offenses or of offenses against obscure sections of finance acts than the
punishment of thieves or blackmailers. Antitrust offenses certainly come
into the same category and those who commit them tend to be respectable persons not easy to associate with deliberate moral failing.
It is this fact which has largely prevented the imposition of jail sentences
on antitrust offenders. The Sherman Act provides for sentences of imprisonment up to one year, but in practice such sentences are hardly ever
imposed. The very few cases in which jail sentences have been imposed
have mostly featured some element of racketeering or fraud which aroused
moral indignation. From time to time the Government presses strongly
for jail sentences in very flagrant cases . . . and some courts have served
warning that they may take this step. It is still most unlikely to become
common.
Id. at 394-96.
152 Because of the underlying nature of the offense, if it were not constructed so that
compensatory civil sanctions were the exclusive remedy of the civil track, it would
probably tip the balance to the degree necessary for the application of the sixth amendment. Cf. One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
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appoint attorneys for millions of defendants whose connection with the
sixth amendment is tenuous, the protection which the sixth amendment
affords can be extended to all "criminal" defendants without the fear
of the system breaking down under the strain.
Certainly there exist many reasons for decriminalization quite independent of the resource question raised by appointing attorneys for all
criminal defendants. To that extent, much of the foregoing discussion
concerning the scope of the sixth amendment has an application entirely
apart from the question of counsel.
No discussion of the question of appointment of counsel, though, can
effectively deal with the magnitude of the problem that will be created
by a decision extending the Argersinger case without firm understanding
of just these issues. And the question of counsel is after all, intertwined
with whatever other reasons there may be for removing an offense from
the criminal code and placing it in a civil context. Of all the procedural
requirements for sixth amendment criminal prosecutions, rights to
counsel and to a jury are the most costly to implement, and most offenses which are candidates for decriminalization are petty offenses that
do not require a jury trial in any case.
For some minor offenses like housing code violations, concerns about
the cost of appointing counsel will surely not play a major role in any
debate on decriminalization. Few, if any, landlords require appointed
attorneys. For other offenses, whose net is cast over a broader economic
spectrum, the cost of keeping the proceedings within the criminal justice
system may be the deciding factor. Thus, a proper grasp of the scope
of the sixth amendment may well provide a firm basis for change in two
areas: extending the right to counsel, and limiting the use of penal
sanctions.

